Consumer Finance Law Blog : Washington D.C. Consumer Finance Lawyer & Attorney : Kelley Drye & Warren Law Firm : Financial Privacy & Security

A federal court in California recently sided with twenty-six state attorneys general and several objectors in rejecting a proposed class action settlement that called for Honda to provide over 175,000 Honda Civic Hybrid owners a coupon worth no more than $1,000 toward purchasing a new Honda vehicle. In True v. American Honda Motor Co., No. EDCV07-0287-VAP(OPX) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2010), the plaintiffs alleged that Honda used false and misleading advertisements regarding the fuel efficiency of its Honda Civic Hybrid to induce customers to pay $2,500 more for the Hybrid than for the comparably equipped standard-engine Honda Civic, even though the Hybrid gets only marginally better gas mileage. Under the proposed settlement, class members were to receive a DVD with tips on how to improve their gas mileage, an opportunity to receive a rebate on the future purchase of another Honda, and, for less than two percent of the class, an opportunity to make a claim for $100. The settlement also provided that Honda would not oppose class counsel’s motion for nearly $3 million in attorneys’ fees.

In an order entered on February 26, 2010, the court denied final approval of the settlement. Specifically, the court held that the proposed settlement’s award of a cash payment to only a select group of the class “creates the most significant obstacle to approval” of the settlement, and that the members of this sub-group were the only class members who would receive a true cash award in the settlement.

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In a unanimous decision Tuesday in Hertz v. Friend, -- U.S. --, No. 08-1107, 2010 WL 605601 (Feb. 23, 2010), the Supreme Court clarified the test federal courts should apply to determine a corporation’s citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, holding that corporations are citizens of the state of their “nerve center” – usually their corporate headquarters – not of any state where a plurality of their business activity occurs.

As explained in a recent Kelley Drye client advisory, the Hertz decision resolves years of uncertainty about how to determine a corporation’s “principal place of business” for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Numerous circuits, including the Ninth Circuit, have applied the so-called “total activity” test, which assessed the amount of the corporation’s activity in each state and deemed the corporation a citizen of any state in which its activity was “significantly larger” or “substantially predominates” over its activity in other states. This test left many national companies, including Hertz, unable to remove state-court class actions to federal court in populous states such as California, where they are not headquartered but do a large amount of business. The Hertz decision rejects the “total activity” test and adopts a simpler test, applied in the Seventh Circuit, known as the “nerve center” test. Under this approach, a corporation’s “principal place of business” is “the place where a corporation’s officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities… [which] should normally be the place where the corporation maintains its headquarters.”

The Court’s decision should be welcome news to corporate defendants, as it will provide greater certainty and predictability about where major litigation affecting multi-state businesses will be litigated, and is likely to limit the need for costly jurisdictional discovery in many cases going forward.

(Kelley Drye & Warren LLP Associate Joanna Baden-Mayer contributed to this post.)
 

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Numerous class action suits have been brought over the past several years under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) against entities that fax unsolicited advertisements (so-called “blast faxes”) to individuals and businesses.  Companies facing such suits in turn have sought insurance coverage under their comprehensive general liability (“CGL”) policies for costs incurred defending TCPA suits, and for indemnification of any liability.

While coverage disputes in blast faxing cases have historically yielded mixed results, a series of recent rulings have tilted the scales in favor of policyholders.  For example, the Florida Supreme Court decided on January 28, 2010 in Penzer v. Transportation Ins. Co., No. SC08-2068, 2010 WL 308043, that a standard CGL policy provided coverage for a suit brought under TCPA for alleged blast fax activities.  While other recent decisions have yielded similar results, Penzer is significant because it held that the plain language of the insurance policy compels coverage.

Despite the holding in Penzer, insurers will likely use the lack of unanimity among courts, and the potential for inconsistent results in jurisdictions yet to address the issue, as a basis to deny claims going forward.  Policyholders would be well served to not take these denials at face value, but rather should demand the coverage to which they are entitled.

A client advisory prepared by Kelley Drye & Warren LLP’s Insurance Recovery Group summarizes recent coverage decisions regarding blast faxing, including the Penzer decision, and discusses the implications of those cases for policyholders.

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If your company collects customers’ personal data in the course of its business, be aware of the wave of class actions that have recently been filed arising out of data security breaches. Finkelstein Thompson, a DC-based law firm, over the past year has filed a series of class actions against businesses that have fallen victim to such data breaches.

One such suit, filed in the Northern District of Georgia, asserts claims against RBS WorldPay, Inc. for negligence, breach of implied contracts, and violation of state unfair trade law, after hackers allegedly gained access to the personal information of approximately 1.5 million RBS cardholders. In an incident apparently related to this security breach, Fox News reported -- citing FBI sources-- that thieves, using cloned ATM cards with the stolen data, withdrew $9 million from ATMs in a coordinated attack in 49 cities, including Atlanta, Chicago, New York, Montreal, Moscow, and Hong Kong. This incident has garnered considerable media attention and will likely result in similar suits being filed against RBS across the country as a result of the security breach.

While this sort of case is extremely difficult to sustain given the absence of actual harm, the litigation and reputational costs associated with them are significant for businesses targeted by this litigation, particularly given the resulting media attention. Therefore, be forewarned, and regularly evaluate your data collection, data use, and data maintenance procedures and infrastructure with both your IT personnel and legal counsel.

For further discussion of this case, see our recently published piece in the ABA “Secure Times” newsletter. And for a broader discussion of how other cases have addressed these types of claims, please see our article published in Andrews Litigation Reporter.

(Kelley Drye & Warren LLP Associate Veronica D. Jackson contributed to this post.)

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A number of class action lawsuits recently have been filed in California state court in San Diego County against a wide range of merchants as well as gift card issuers alleging, among other things, that the defendants have violated the California Civil Code by issuing gift cards that bear either an obscured expiration date, or an expiration date that is not as prominently displayed as is required under California state law. Section 1749.5 of the California Civil Code makes it unlawful to sell gift certificates or gift cards that contain an expiration date unless the expiration date appears in capital letters in at least 10-point font on the front of the gift card. So far retailers such as Saks, Staples, Borders, Visa, and American Express, among others, have been sued in separate class actions alleging violations of Section 1749.5, as well as the Business and Professions Code and the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act.

For example, in Michaelson v. Staples, Inc., Case No. 37-2009-00083487 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Diego Cty.), plaintiff alleges that an expiration date on a Staples gift card, mailed to the plaintiff as part of a promotion, was in less than 10-point font. Plaintiff alleges the card expired before he noticed the expiration date. In Robert Loiseau v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., Case No. 37-2009-00085443 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Diego Cty.), plaintiff alleges that a gift card, purchased for its face value, improperly contained an obscured expiration date, charged a processing fee, and required other allegedly unreasonable terms and conditions.

Gift cards are a tricky business when it comes to complying with the patchwork quilt of state-by-state regulations (as well as FTC oversight) over them. The permissibility of expiration dates, redemption in cash once a minimum balance has been reached, disclosures of terms and conditions, and escheatment of remaining balances are just some of the issues that businesses must confront and address. This new wave of lawsuits serves as a reminder to merchants and gift card issuers of the need to monitor state and federal regulations, as well as to periodically evaluate their gift card programs with counsel.

(Kelley Drye & Warren LLP Associate Elissa O. Tomanda contributed to this post.)

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Several weeks ago, we discussed how most courts were rejecting lawsuits where the plaintiffs claimed “damages” in the form of an increased risk of identity theft, generally stemming from allegations of an accidental loss or theft of personal confidential information. Since we last blogged on this issue, two recent decisions highlight how that trend is continuing, and that courts increasingly require more than speculation about future harm to sustain a lawsuit over the loss of confidential information.

The first notable decision involved a court which was clearly aware of this growing body of case law. In Belle Chasse Automotive Care, Inc. v. Advanced Auto Parts, Inc., United States District Court Judge Kurt Engelhardt of the Eastern District of Louisiana dismissed a claim stemming from a security breach involving confidential information. The plaintiff in Belle Chasse alleged that this breach only had caused an increased risk of identity theft, not an actual identity theft. The court granted defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and cited to the growing body of case law from around the nation supporting the position that these allegations amount only to “speculative damages for which [Louisiana] law provides no remedy.” Notably, the Court cited to the Pinero decision we referenced in our prior post and found United States District Court Judge Sarah Vance’s analysis in that case to be “directly on point.”

The second notable decision provides an example of a Court reversing course on this issue, citing this line of cases as authority. The Ruiz v. Gap, Inc. case already was notable in that United States District Court Judge Samuel Conti, in March 2008, had previously ruled  that allegations of a potentially increased risk of future identity theft were sufficient to make out a viable negligence claim under California law. At that time, Judge Conti denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and held that the plaintiff had alleged an injury in fact, even though he noted that it was unclear what damages the plaintiff would be able to recover even if the plaintiff were to prevail on the merits. Compared to the many cases holding to the contrary, the Ruiz case was generally viewed as an outlier, as one of the few rulings to have held that an allegation of the mere increased risk of identity theft was sufficient to defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

But just this month, Judge Conti granted summary judgment to the defendants on this same issue. In doing so, the court held that an increased risk of identity theft did not constitute “the level of appreciable harm necessary to assert a negligence claim under California law.” The court expressly rejected parallels to medical monitoring claims in the toxic tort context, and expressly noted similar cases from other jurisdictions – namely Louisiana, Ohio, and Minnesota – none of which were referenced in the court’s 2008 opinion denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The decision appears to reflect a reconsideration of sorts by the court – the evidence obtained during depositions seemed to be no different from what the plaintiff alleged in his Complaint, so if those allegations were adequate to defeat a motion to dismiss, testimony to the same effect should have also been adequate to defeat summary judgment. This is merely our own speculation, but it could be that the court became aware, over the course of the past year, of the growing and substantial body of case law which has been rejecting these types of speculative claims.
 

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In order to avoid the substantial risks of class action litigation, many financial service providers – both traditional and non traditional – require that customer agreements contain an arbitration clause and a waiver of the customer’s right to bring a class action. However, recent court decisions and pending legislation suggest that certain types of these arbitration clauses may no longer be viable.

The overwhelming body of case law upholds the enforceability of such arbitration and class waiver provisions. See Adler v. Dell, Inc., No. 08-CV-13170, 2008 WL 5351042 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 18, 2008) (enforcing consumer arbitration provision with class waiver); Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., LLC, 400 F.3d 868 (11th Cir. 2005) (class waiver in borrowers’ payday loan agreements did not render arbitration agreements unconscionable or unenforceable); and Snowden v. CheckPoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631 (4th Cir. 2002) (rejecting argument that arbitration agreement was unenforceable as unconscionable due to class waiver).

However, recently some courts have taken issue with these provisions and deemed them unconscionable. A recent example of such a case is Homa v. American Express Co., No. 06-02985, 2009 WL 440912 (3rd Cir. Feb. 24, 2009).

In Homa, plaintiff brought a putative class action suit against American Express and its Centurion unit, alleging that they misrepresented the actual terms of the Blue Cash card rewards program and that defendants failed to award him the promised amount of cash back in violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act. However, the credit card member agreement that accompanied the Blue Cash card contained an arbitration and class waiver provision. Further, the agreement contained a choice-of-law provision indicating that any disputes arising out of the agreement would be governed by Utah law. Defendants argued that the plaintiff should be required to arbitrate his claims on an individual basis, because Utah law expressly allows arbitration and class waiver provisions in consumer credit agreements. On the other hand, the plaintiff argued that New Jersey law applied, because, as the application of Utah law would violate New Jersey’s public policy against certain class-arbitration waivers, New Jersey choice-of-law principles dictated that the agreement’s choice of Utah law was invalid. The district court sided with the defendants and dismissed plaintiff’s complaint.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision. In the opinion, the Third Circuit held that that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, did not preclude the district court from applying New Jersey unconscionability principles to void the arbitration and class waiver clause, and therefore, plaintiff was entitled to pursue a class action against defendants in federal court in New Jersey. In so doing, the Court relied on the holding in a New Jersey state court decision styled Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Delaware, 912 A.2d 88 (N.J. 2006), that “‘[t]he public interest at stake in . . . consumers[’] [ability to effectively] pursue their statutory rights under [New Jersey’s] consumer protection laws’ constituted the ‘most important’ reason for holding a similar class-arbitration waiver unconscionable.” Further, the Third Circuit held that this interest “overrides” a defendant’s right to seek enforcement of a class-arbitration waiver in an agreement, particularly where the claims at issue are of such a low value as effectively to preclude relief if pursued individually. The case is now back in the district court.

Furthermore, this issue may be resolved by pending federal legislation that seeks to ban certain types of arbitration provisions. The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 would ban provisions requiring arbitration of (1) an employment, consumer, or franchise dispute, or (2) a dispute arising under any statute intended to protect civil rights. See H.R. 1020   The bill, which was referred to the House Judiciary Committtee on Feb. 12, 2009, currently has 43 co-sponsors, including that Committee Chairman Conyers (D-MI). A recent Legal Times report noted the plaintiffs bar's efforts to push the arbitration legislation on Capitol Hill. If enacted, the Act could start a wave of litigation in the consumer financial services sector.

The bottom line is that businesses should re-examine their customer agreement’s arbitration and class waiver provisions, paying particular attention to any choice of law provisions, and monitor these legal developments on a state-by-state basis. Homa tells us that the same arbitration and class waiver provision, while being upheld in one state, could be rejected in another.

Stay tuned for future posts analyzing cases decided in the wake of Homa and reporting on further developments with the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009….

(Kelley Drye & Warren LLP Associate Veronica Gray contributed to this post)
 

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The Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) eliminated longstanding barriers to removal of cases from state to federal court. To remove a class action under CAFA, it is no longer necessary for all plaintiffs and defendants to be completely diverse; now, only one class member and one defendant must be citizens of different states. Certain exceptions, however, including the local controversy exception, limit this broad access to federal court and provide a means for parties to keep certain actions in state court. The local controversy exception provides that federal court must decline jurisdiction where “significant” relief is sought from at least one defendant in the case whose conduct forms a “significant basis” for the claims asserted by the putative class. The Third Circuit, in Kaufman v. Allstate New Jersey Insurance Co., 561 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2009), recently became the first Court of Appeals to hold that CAFA does not require every class member to assert a claim against that local defendant for the action to remain in state court.

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Over the last few years, incidents involving disclosures of personal information by consumer financial service providers have been big news, ranging from the theft of laptop computers containing social security numbers, to hacker attacks on computer networks containing confidential information, to the more "vanilla" theft of personal documents. Not surprisingly, the plaintiffs' bar has been attempting to turn all of this worry about identity theft into big money - even where no identity theft has occurred. However, courts around the nation have been considering such claims, and responding with a virtually uniform voice to state that, however the claim may be styled, a plaintiff's speculative fear of potential future identity theft does not constitute "actual damages" under the law, and accordingly reject such lawsuits.

In the latest court opinion to address this issue, Pinero v. Jackson Hewitt Tax Service, Inc., No. 08-3535, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 660, (E.D. La. January 7, 2009), Chief Judge Sarah S. Vance dismissed various statutory and tort claims, including negligence, breach of contract, violations of a Louisiana data breach notification statute, and claims under the Tax Reform Act of 1976, against a national franchisor of income tax preparation services and its local independent franchisee. In the Pinero case, the plaintiff contended that the independent franchisee had failed to dispose of certain documents properly, which allegedly contained personal information. However, the plaintiff neither contended that her documents fell into the hands of a wrong-doer, nor that she had suffered any actual identity theft. Her damages claims were largely based on alleged emotional injuries and mental anguish, and theoretical consequential damages about steps she might need to take to deal with potential identity theft.

The Court rejected this theory of damages, and dismissed 6 of 7 claims, including negligence, breach of contract, and violations of the Louisiana data breach notification statute, holding that this type of speculative “injury” does not meet the required damages element. Also, in a holding of first impression, Judge Vance dismissed the federal claim for statutory penalties under the Tax Reform Act of 1976, ruling that commercial tax preparers are simply not subject to the provisions of the law governing disclosure of tax return information by the I.R.S. or its agents. The Court further ruled that the Louisiana data breach notification statute did not apply to paper documents – notably, Louisiana is not alone in this regard. Judge Vance also dismissed claims for fraudulent inducement and the Louisiana unfair trade practice law for a failure to adequately allege an intent to defraud. The Court only let the invasion of privacy claim survive, albeit noting skepticism about whether such a claim could succeed on the merits.

For further discussion of this case, see our recently published piece in the ABA "Secure Times" newsletter. And for a broader discussion of how other cases have addressed these types of claims, please see our article published in Andrews Litigation Reporter.

(Donna L. Wilson, Andrew S. Wein, and Veronica D. Gray represent Jackson Hewitt Tax Service in this case.)
 

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The latest class action complaints alleging improper subprime lending practices are due to be filed against two banks today. The NAACP plans to file separate class action lawsuits today against Wells Fargo and HSBC. According to news reports, the suits, which will be filed in district court in California, allege that those banks engaged in deliberate discriminatory practices that forced minority borrowers into loans with higher interest rates than non-minority borrowers with similar credit histories. These actions follow, and appear to be an extension of, an NAACP lawsuit filed against HSBC, Countrywide, and at least 17 other mortgage lenders in 2007. That suit, which is still under way and recently survived a motion to dismiss, alleges broad discriminatory lending practices by mortgage lenders. These NAACP actions are just a few in a growing number of cases filed by private individuals and state and local governments relating to subprime lending.

All of those suits presumably support Congress' aggressive financial system reform agenda, including legislation to address mortgage lending practices. Yesterday, the House Committee on Financial Services held a major hearing to review mortgage lending practices and legislation to reform those practices. The chairman of that committee, Barney Frank (D-MA), announced that he plans to move that legislation out of committee this month, with the goal of a full House vote some time in April.
 

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As of January 1, 2009, and in contrast to federal law, California Civil Code Section 1747.09 requires that no more than the last five digits of a credit or debit card number be printed on both the electronically-printed card receipt retained by the business as well as the receipt provided to customers. See CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1747.09(a)-(d). If you or your business accept credit cards or debit cards for payment you must ensure that all machines and registers are in compliance with these truncation requirements. Businesses that fail to comply with revised Section 1747.09 face potentially significant consequences, including enforcement actions by state agencies, and, perhaps more significantly, individual and class action lawsuits brought by cardholders.

A brief look at the recent history of class actions filed under the federal truncation statute – the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), which applies only to transaction receipts provided to customers – may offer guidance on how California courts may deal with actions brought under Section 1747.09.

Beginning in December 2006, plaintiffs’ attorneys began filing class action lawsuits against a broad spectrum of retailers and other businesses in California based largely on the failure to truncate expiration dates on electronically printed credit card receipts provided to consumers, and sought statutory penalties of between $100 and $1,000 per transaction for each “willful” violation alleged, plus attorneys’ fees, costs and punitive damages. See15 U.S.C. § 1681n. In order to prevent consumers, who had not suffered any actual damage, from recovering potentially annihilating statutory damages against retailers and other merchants, Congress passed the Credit and Debit Card Receipt Clarification Act, which added a provision to the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (“FACTA”) preventing consumers from obtaining statutory damages for willful expiration date violations taking place between December 4, 2004 and June 3, 2008. Further, several courts refused to certify a class on the theory that a class action is not superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. However, no similar legislation has been enacted by the California legislature, and it remains to be seen whether courts will deny certification of a class action brought under Section 1747.09, as several courts have done in FACTA cases, to limit abusive lawsuits brought by consumers under California state law.

Accordingly, if you have not already done so, you should act swiftly to ensure that all machines and registers are in compliance with the truncation requirements. To accomplish this, consider auditing machines and registers by printing out receipts both retained by the company and issued to the customer. If any violation of Section 1747.09 or FACTA is detected, corrective action should be taken to limit potential liability and to decrease the risk of a potential lawsuit. 

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