Consumer Finance Law Blog : Consumer Finance Lawyer & Attorney : Kelley Drye & Warren Law Firm : Financial Privacy & Security

This is an update to an earlier post regarding the Federal Reserve Board’s final rules implementing the gift card provisions of the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 (“CARD Act”). On July 27, 2010, H.R. 5502 was signed into law, extending the effective date of disclosure requirements under the CARD Act from August 22, 2010 to January 31, 2011, for qualifying gift cards produced prior to April 1, 2010. You may recall that the rules restrict fees and expiration dates on various types of gift certificates and cards, and require sellers and issuers to make specific disclosures.

Gift Certificates, Store Gift Cards, and General-Use Prepaid Cards

Generally, the rules restrict fees, expiration dates, and impose certain disclosure requirements for (A) gift certificates, (B) store gift cards, and (C) general-use prepaid cards, as these terms (collectively, “gift cards”) are defined in the CARD Act.

Definitions

(A) Gift Certificates – are defined in the CARD Act as a card, code, or other device that is: (i) redeemable at a single merchant or an affiliated group of merchants that share the same name, mark, or logo; (ii) issued in a specified amount that may not be increased or reloaded; (iii) purchased on a prepaid basis in exchange for payment; and (iv) honored upon presentation by such single merchant or affiliated group of merchants for goods or services.

(B) Store Gift Cards – these types of cards are commonly known as “closed-loop cards”, and are essentially the same as Gift Certificates, but are reloadable or may be increased in value. The CARD Act specifically defines these cards as electronic promises, plastic cards, or other payment codes or devices that are: (i) redeemable at a single merchant or an affiliated group of merchants that share the same name, mark, or logo; (ii) issued in a specified amount, whether or not that amount may be increased in value or reloaded at the request of the holder; (iii) purchased on a prepaid basis in exchange for payment; and (iv) honored upon presentation by such single merchant or affiliated group of merchants for goods or services.

(C) General-Use Prepaid Cards – commonly referred to as “open-loop cards”, are defined in the CARD Act as cards or other payment codes or devices issued by any person that are: (i) redeemable at multiple, unaffiliated merchants or service providers, or automated teller machines; (ii) issued in a requested amount, whether or not that amount may, at the option of the issuer, be increased in value or reloaded if requested by the holder; (iii) purchased or loaded on a prepaid basis; and (iv) honored, upon presentation, by merchants for goods or services or at automated teller machines.

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In a decision that could render the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) virtually meaningless, the Eleventh Circuit recently held sua sponte that CAFA does not allow for federal court jurisdiction over class actions unless the amount in controversy for at least one plaintiff (or class member) exceeds $75,000. Should this decision hold up, courts in the Eleventh Circuit would lack jurisdiction over virtually all consumer class actions, most of which involve modest claims, whether they are originally filed in or subsequently removed to federal court.

As you may know from previous posts on this blog, Congress enacted CAFA in 2005 to curb “abuses of the class action device,” including state courts being overly friendly toward class certification, insufficient notice being provided to putative class members, and favoring some plaintiffs over others in making class awards. CAFA was supposed to situate more class actions in federal court and make it easier for defendants in a state court action to remove the action to federal court. CAFA provides federal courts with original jurisdiction over class actions in which the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000 (aggregating individual class member claims to meet this threshold) and there is minimal diversity (at least one plaintiff and one defendant are from different states).

In Cappuccitti v. DirecTV, Inc., No. 09-14107 (11th Cir. July 19, 2010), plaintiffs sued DirecTV seeking the recovery, on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated DirecTV subscribers in Georgia, of the fees DirecTV charges its subscribers for canceling their subscriptions prior to the subscriptions’ expiration. The fees ranged from $175 to $480 per subscriber. DirecTV moved to compel plaintiffs to submit to arbitration, per the arbitration and class action waiver provision in the DirecTV subscriber agreements, and to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs did not move to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim, and plaintiffs appealed. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the complaint, it vacated the district court’s order, and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the complaint.

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Last week the BNA Privacy & Security Law Report published an article discussing in detail California’s Song-Beverly Credit Card Act (the “Act”). The aim of the article is to provide those persons and businesses that regularly engage in credit card transactions in California, most notably retail merchants, with a meaningful primer on some critical current and developing aspects of the Act.  The article provides an overview of the Act’s provisions, and discusses the important legal issues surrounding the Act, including several that California courts have resolved, several that are currently pending before those courts, and one that may be resolved in the near future.

On a related note, the California Court of Appeals, Fourth Appellate Division, recently issued a decision in Carson v. Michaels Stores, Inc., which addressed several issues under the Act. See id. at No. 37-2008-00089773-CU-BT-CTL, 2010 WL 2862077 (Cal. App. Ct. July 22, 2010). Carson filed a complaint against Michaels Stores, Inc., alleging violations of the Act and her constitutional right to privacy by requesting and recording her zip code, and then using her zip code to obtain her address from a public database. First, the court, following Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc., 100 Cal.Rptr.3d 458 (Cal. App. Ct. 2009), affirmed the trial court’s holding that zip codes are not personal identification information under the Act. Because zip codes are not personal identification information under the Act, Michael’s use of this information to obtain plaintiff’s address was also held not to be prohibited under the Act. Id. at 7. (See our prior posts discussing Pineda and issues under the Act.)

In addition, the court held that plaintiff had no reasonable expectation of privacy in her address – as it was obtained from public databases available on the Internet – and therefore plaintiff did not have a valid invasion of privacy claim under the California constitution. Id. at 9-10.

Notably, the court declined to decide a significant open issue under the Act – whether the Act prohibits a retailer from requesting personal information as a condition of accepting the customer’s credit card payment.  Id. at n.4. This open issue is discussed in detail in the above-referenced article.

Kelley Drye attorney Veronica Jackson contributed to this post.

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Recent posts on this blog have discussed questions as to the continued viability of arbitration clauses that require consumer agreements to contain an arbitration clause and a waiver of the customer’s right to bring a class action. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court is to decide in the upcoming term whether agreements barring class-wide arbitration can be invalidated under State law, and Congress may kill mandatory arbitration in consumer finance transactions. This judicial and legislative trend to limit, and even eliminate, the use of arbitrations has been continued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in its decision in Fensterstock v. Affiliated Computer Services, 09 CV 1562 (2d Cir. 7/12/10).

The Second Circuit struck down, under California law, the use of loan agreements that contain arbitration clauses and a waiver of the customer’s right to bring a class action. The Second Circuit held that a lawyer who sued a student loan company over alleged hidden fees in loan agreements cannot be forced into arbitration and can pursue a class action. The Second Circuit ruled that the loan agreement’s class action and class arbitration waiver clauses were unconscionable under California law because they are a “standard contract of adhesion drafted by a party that had superior bargaining power,” and, therefore, are unenforceable. “Such a clause presented to the weaker party on a take-it-or-leave-it basis without the opportunity for meaningful negotiation is, under California law, oppressive, and satisfied the requirement that there be at least a minimal showing of procedural unconscionability.” According to the Court, although the plaintiff was versed in complex financial transactions, there was nothing to suggest that he had any opportunity to negotiate that clause out of the contract. Further, applying the remainder of a three-part test under California law for determining whether a clause in a contract is unconscionable, the Court held that the disputes on the alleged damages “predictably involve small amounts of damages,” and the plaintiff alleged the two companies were “deliberately carrying out a scheme to cheat large numbers of borrowers out of individually small amounts of money.”

While the Second Circuit reiterated the Federal Arbitration Act’s and “Congress’ purpose in enacting the Federal Arbitration Act ‘to reverse the long standing judicial hostility to arbitration agreements . . . and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts[,]’” judicial hostility, at least as applied under California law, appears to remain. The Second Circuit’s interpretation of contract principles under California law, leading to its determination that the contract clauses were procedurally and substantively unconscionable, trumped the Federal Arbitration Act’s purpose and principles, like many courts seemingly do today. 

Whether the Supreme Court or Congress will continue that trend remains to be seen. Thus, companies that have consumer or employment contracts that contain such clauses should continue to seek to enforce them in court; however, remember that their enforceability may be significantly limited. As noted previously in this blog, companies should continue to monitor developments at the federal and state level, and re-examine their consumer or employment agreement’s arbitration and class action clauses to seek the best choice of law and jurisdiction for enforcement of such clauses. Please also remember to check back here for further updates.

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