Financial Reform Negotiations Conclude

After working through the night, the Congressional conference committee tasked with negotiating a final financial reform bill voted 27-16 to approve the bill and send it back to each chamber for a final vote on the conference report.

Recaps of the long day and night of negotiations and the final bill are available from Poltico, the Wall Street Journal, and American Banker, among many others.

With regard to certain of the issues we have been following closely here, in the end, auto dealers will be exempt from the purview of the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, but payday lenders and other non-bank financial service providers will be subject to the new regulator. In addition, the Federal Reserve will be permitted to cap interchange fees, except for those on cards issued by governments.

The bill includes myriad other important provisions related to mortgage lending, the activities of banks, insurance regulation, corporate governance, and more. The Wall Street Journal provides an overview of some of the “major” provisions. Over the coming weeks and months we will be taking a closer look at certain aspects of the final bill and their implications, for example, increased litigation risk for financial service providers, including merchants and retailers.

Congress Moves Closer to Final Financial Reform Bill

A conference committee comprised of members from both chambers of Congress has been meeting for the past two weeks to address differences between the House and Senate versions of financial reform legislation, with the Senate bill serving as the base text. Negotiators are trying to wrap up deliberations today in hopes of passing a final bill before the July 4 recess. This Reuters piece provides a summary of some of certain elements of the bill and how they are being addressed in conference. While some broad components have been resolved, several critical details regarding consumer financial protection remain unsettled.

Earlier this week the conferees reached agreement to accept the Senate bill’s proposal to place a new financial reform regulator within the Federal Reserve Board, as opposed to creating a new stand-alone Consumer Financial Protection Agency envisioned by the House bill. Many congressional leaders have been critical of the Fed’s role in consumer protection leading up to the financial crisis. The new regulator, however, would function independent of the Fed management.

While this agreement was a necessary first step in the negotiations, the scope of the consumer protection authority is still being defined. For example, no agreement has yet been reached on whether or not auto dealers should be exempt from the new regulator’s oversight. The bill passed by the House exempted auto dealers but the Senate bill did not. The Senate conferees were asked by their chamber to pursue an exemption in conference negotiations. In doing so, Senate representatives have suggested exempting auto dealers from direct supervision by the new consumer regulator, but allowing the Federal Reserve to oversee such auto dealers with regard to truth-in-lending laws. Auto dealers, like GMAC, that provide their own financing would remain under the supervision of the new consumer regulator.

The fate of other non-traditional consumer financial service providers also has yet to be decided. The Senate conferees, in rejecting House proposals, have offered language to subject pawnbrokers and employee benefit plans to consumer regulatory oversight, while excluding payday lenders and check cashing agencies.

Finally, negotiations continue regarding the power of the FTC. The House asked to remove existing requirements that the FTC provide notice to Congress and develop evidence in advance of proposing new rules governing unfair and deceptive trade practices. The House proposal would allow the FTC to operate under the standard Administrative Procedures Act processes that employ a notice and comment rulemaking. Senate negotiators rejected that House proposed language, which also would: 1) give the FTC authority to issue civil penalties for unfair and deceptive trade practices without involving the DOJ; and 2) allow the FTC to act against third parties found to be assisting in unfair practices. No final agreement had been reached as of this writing.

The conferees have addressed many other provisions of the bill. A full rundown of the offers and agreements by title is provided by the Senate Banking Committee.
 

Third Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Consumer Class Action Arising Out of NFL "Spygate" Scandal

The Third Circuit in Mayer v. Belichick recently affirmed dismissal of a consumer class action filed by disappointed football fans and season ticket-holders in response to the now infamous “spygate” scandal. As you may recall, this scandal arose when it was discovered that the New England Patriots were surreptitiously videotaping the defensive signals of the New York Jets. The NFL found that the Patriots and Belichick improperly engaged in such conduct. The named plaintiff, a Jets fan and season ticket holder, pursued the claim on behalf of Jets’ season ticket holders against the Patriots as well as the team’s head coach, Bill Belichick, and the NFL.

Among other things, plaintiff alleged that in purchasing tickets to watch the Jets that, as a matter of contract, the tickets imply that each game will be played in accordance with NFL rules and regulations as well as all applicable federal and state laws. In addition, plaintiff alleged that the defendants tortiously interfered with their contractual relations with the Jets in purchasing the tickets, they violated the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act and the New Jersey Deceptive Business Practices Act, and that they violated federal and state racketeering laws by using the NFL as an enterprise to carry out their illegal scheme. Because the Patriots and Belichick were found in other games to have illegally used video equipment, the action sought damages for Jets ticket-holders for all games played in Giants Stadium between the Jets and Patriots since Belichick became head coach in 2000. Plaintiff sought, among other things, declaratory and injunctive relief, over $61 million in actual damages, punitive and treble damages, and attorneys’ fees. The district court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim.

The issue addressed by the Third Circuit was whether plaintiff stated an actionable injury (i.e., a legally protected right or interest) arising out of the alleged dishonest videotaping program undertaken by the Patriots and Belichick. While the Court acknowledged the unique circumstances of the case, it also recognized that past cases provided the Court with certain legal principles that were relevant to this matter. In affirming the district court’s decision, the Third Circuit traced the history of how tickets to sporting and other entertainment events have been treated in the past, noting that in nearly all of them, the courts held that the ticket merely gave the fan a license to a seat from which to watch the event, but did not create a contract to present any particular kind of show or dictate the manner in which it was to presented. Because plaintiff was allowed to enter the stadium and witnessed the game between the Jets and Patriots, he suffered no cognizable injury to a legally protected right or interest.

A ruling by the Third Circuit in favor of the plaintiff could have had a dramatic impact on both courts and those in the sports and entertainment business. For example, disappointed fans potentially could have sued for a “blown call” or as a result of one team stealing a catcher’s signals that led to the loss of a game. The Third Circuit refused to countenance such a course of action that would have burdened the courts and forced these businesses to defend against such litigation.

Minnesota Enacts Mortgage Licensing Law

On May 15, 2010, the Governor of Minnesota signed into law the Minnesota S.A.F.E. Mortgage Licensing Act of 2010 (Minnesota S.A.F.E. Act), which requires that mortgage loan originators be licensed by July 31, 2010, the act’s effective date. In passing the law, Minnesota joins the other 49 states and the District of Columbia in enacting legislation that complies with the S.A.F.E. Act provisions of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, passed on July 30, 2008.

The federal S.A.F.E. Act “encourages” states to establish minimum standards for uniform license applications and reporting requirements for state-licensed loan originators, in an effort to standardize and more efficiently regulate the nationwide practice of mortgage loan origination.  While it provides states with minimum standards, the federal S.A.F.E. Act does not preclude states from imposing tougher standards as long as those standards do not frustrate the purposes of the federal S.A.F.E. Act.

The Minnesota S.A.F.E. Act defines a “mortgage loan originator” (MLO) as “an individual who for compensation or gain or in the expectation of compensation or gain takes a residential mortgage loan application; or offers or negotiates terms of a residential mortgage loan.” Loan processors and underwriters are not considered MLOs, and are prohibited from advertising that they will do anything only an MLO is allowed to do. Applicants for a license must pass a written test and must submit to a background check by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 

Disputes remain concerning how the federal government will determine whether states are complying with the federal S.A.F.E. Act, so we can expect further developments on this issue in the coming months.

Will Congress Kill Mandatory Arbitration In Consumer Finance Transactions?

In 2007, Congress introduced legislation, entitled the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, to amend the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) to render unenforceable predispute arbitration provisions in, among other things, agreements concerning consumer transactions. The legislation permitted parties to consumer transactions to agree to arbitrate disputes but only after the dispute arose and required courts to decide any dispute concerning the validity or enforceability of an arbitration agreement even when the arbitration agreement required submission of issues concerning arbitrability to the arbitrator. The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007 died in committee, but in 2009 was re-introduced in both the House as H.R. 1020 and the Senate, S. 931, as the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009. (See a previous post entitled “The End of the Arbitration Clause?” discussing recent court decisions and highlighting this pending legislation). To date, limited action has been taken on the respective bills.

While Congress has yet to act on broad amendments to the FAA, prohibition on mandatory arbitration clauses in connection with the provision of certain consumer financial products or services could be enacted as part of the sweeping Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173 (the “Wall Street Reform Act”). (See previous post on the Senate’s version of financial system regulatory reform legislation, the Restoring American Financial Stability Act). Among other things, the Wall Street Reform Act would create a Consumer Financial Protection Agency. The director of the proposed Agency will have authority to:

Prohibit or impose conditions or limitations on the use of any agreement between a covered person [defined, with limitations, as any person who engages directly or indirectly in a financial activity in connection with the provision of a consumer financial product or service, (H.R. 4173, at § 4111)] and a consumer for a consumer financial product or service providing for arbitration of any future dispute between the parties if the Director finds that such a prohibition or imposition of conditions or limitations are in the public interest and for the protection of consumers. H.R. 4173, at § 4208.  

This legislation has passed both Houses of Congress and has been submitted to a Joint Conference Committee to resolve differences between the House and Senate versions. Assuming the final legislation includes a new consumer protection entity with authority to promulgate rules regulating arbitration in disputes related to consumer financial products or services, federal oversight of mandatory predispute arbitration provisions in agreements related to consumer financial products or services will likely come to fruition. That said, the creation of a new federal regulator would likely be time consuming and the promulgation of rules prohibiting arbitration would require, among other things, notice and comment. Thus, while it appears that the use of mandatory predispute arbitration provisions in agreements related to consumer financial products or services is at least headed for federal oversight, absent revival of the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, it will likely take several years before that federal oversight is in place.

Legal Developments Affecting Payment Card Data Pass Practices

On-line marketers that share their customers’ credit or payment card information with other business partners without the consumer’s knowledge or active consent – a practice referred to as a “data pass” – may wish to read a recently published BNA Privacy & Security Law Report titled “Scrutiny on Payment Card Data Pass: Raising the Profile of Personal Information Sharing Among Marketers.” Kelley Drye attorneys Alysa Z. Hutnik and Joseph D. Wilson co-authored this article, which:

  • explores a rule recently announced by VISA and legislation recently proposed by Senate Commerce Committee Chairman, Jay Rockefeller (D-W.Va.) entitled “The Restore Online Shoppers’ Confidence Act” (S. 3386), both of which restrict companies’ ability to share customer payment card information. (Visit Kelley Drye's Advertising Law Blog for related articles on these topics);
  • reviews two recently filed class actions, Ferrington, et al. v. McAfee Inc., 5:10-cv-1455 (N.D. Cal.), and Van Tassell, et al. v. United Marketing Group Inc., et al., 1:10-cv-2675 (N.D. Ill.), alleging that the data pass practices of certain on-line marketers violated numerous state consumer protection laws;
  • advises on steps companies should consider taking to mitigate the risk that their data pass practices will come under FTC scrutiny; and
  • discusses considerations companies should make if they find themselves the subject of a class action relating to their data pass practices.

Appellant Attempts to Re-litigate Issue of Whether Retailers that Collect Customer Zip Codes During Credit Card Transactions Violate California's Song Beverly Credit Card Act

In a previous post, we noted that the California Supreme Court in Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc., granted a petition to review the issue of whether a retailer violates California’s Song-Beverly Credit Card Act if, in connection with a credit card transaction, it records a customer’s zip code for the purpose of later using it and the customer’s name to obtain the customer’s address through a reverse search database. The appeal is now fully briefed. The following are some of the more significant arguments proffered by each side, and the potential impact of the ruling on retailers.

The trial court sustained Williams-Sonoma’s demurrer to Pineda’s Section 1747.08 claim on the grounds that under Party City Corp. v. Superior Court, 169 Cal. App. 4th 497 (2008) (discussed previously on this blog), zip codes can never constitute “personal identification information” for purposes of that section.  In its brief, Pineda asks the Supreme Court to disregard this well-reasoned precedent on the grounds that zip codes are expressly defined as “information concerning the cardholder, other than information set forth on the credit card, and including, but not limited to, the cardholder’s address and telephone number.” Pineda argues that the trial court and court of appeal erred by inserting an additional criteria into the definition and requiring that the information be “unique” to the cardholder, rather than merely “concerning” the cardholder as set forth in the statute. In addition, Pineda argues that Williams-Sonoma preys on its credit card customers who are accustomed to providing their zip codes for legitimate verification purposes at gas stations and mistakenly assume that Williams-Sonoma is requesting their zip codes to process their credit cards. Meanwhile, according to Pineda, their sole intent is to use its customers’ zip codes to “covertly” obtain their home addresses to build its customer database.

Williams-Sonoma, on the other hand, argues first that the question of whether a zip code is “personal identification information” was not certified for review by the California Supreme Court, thus, the court of appeal’s decision in Party City stands.  In addition, Williams-Sonoma argues that the Song Beverly Credit Card Act does not prohibit the use of information that is collected by a retailer at the point of sale. Instead, Song Beverly is silent as to any conduct other than the request and recording of “personal identification information” during a credit card transaction. Because a zip code has already been held to not fit within the definition of “personal identification information,” the inquiry ends there – it cannot be transformed into “personal identification information” based on how the zip code is used. Further, according to Williams-Sonoma, there is nothing improper about using zip codes to have third party vendors narrow down publicly available information about customers, such as their address.

How the California Supreme Court resolves this issue may have a substantial impact on retailers that collect customer zip codes. If the Supreme Court accepts Pineda’s interpretation of Song Beverly that zip codes are “personal identification information,” retailers could be left wondering what other conduct is prohibited, since neither “zip codes” nor “reverse data searches” are expressly mentioned in the language of the statute. In addition, after having relied on Party City, retailers could be left wondering whether they are now liable for this conduct under Song Beverly for up to $1,000 per transaction.

This appeal has not yet been set for oral argument.  We will keep you updated as to any developments.

New FACTA Rules Take Effect on July 1, 2010

Businesses have until July 1, 2010 to comply with the new rules and guidelines under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (“FACTA”), which amended the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), adopted by the Federal Trade Commission nearly a year ago relating to information provided to credit reporting agencies. Many know FACTA as the statute that allows consumers to request and obtain a free credit report once every 12 months from each of the three nationwide consumer credit reporting companies (Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion), or the Act that contains provisions to help reduce identity theft. These new guidelines are designed to increase the accuracy and integrity of the information that furnishers provide to credit reporting agencies. The rules, in turn, require furnishers to establish reasonable written policies and procedures that implement the guidelines. The policies and procedures that furnishers are required to establish will vary depending on the “nature, size, complexity, and scope of each furnisher’s activities.” 16 C.F.R. § 660.3(a).  

The rules also provide consumers an additional avenue to challenge the accuracy of information used to generate their credit rating. Historically, consumers were encouraged to deal with the credit reporting agency about the accuracy of such information. Under the new FACTA rules, furnishers are now required, in most cases, to investigate disputes that are submitted directly to them by consumers regarding the accuracy of information that furnishers provided to a credit reporting agency.

Click here to review the final inter-agency rules and guidelines.