Consumer Finance Law Blog : Consumer Finance Lawyer & Attorney : Kelley Drye & Warren Law Firm : Financial Privacy & Security

Several weeks ago, we discussed how most courts were rejecting lawsuits where the plaintiffs claimed “damages” in the form of an increased risk of identity theft, generally stemming from allegations of an accidental loss or theft of personal confidential information. Since we last blogged on this issue, two recent decisions highlight how that trend is continuing, and that courts increasingly require more than speculation about future harm to sustain a lawsuit over the loss of confidential information.

The first notable decision involved a court which was clearly aware of this growing body of case law. In Belle Chasse Automotive Care, Inc. v. Advanced Auto Parts, Inc., United States District Court Judge Kurt Engelhardt of the Eastern District of Louisiana dismissed a claim stemming from a security breach involving confidential information. The plaintiff in Belle Chasse alleged that this breach only had caused an increased risk of identity theft, not an actual identity theft. The court granted defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and cited to the growing body of case law from around the nation supporting the position that these allegations amount only to “speculative damages for which [Louisiana] law provides no remedy.” Notably, the Court cited to the Pinero decision we referenced in our prior post and found United States District Court Judge Sarah Vance’s analysis in that case to be “directly on point.”

The second notable decision provides an example of a Court reversing course on this issue, citing this line of cases as authority. The Ruiz v. Gap, Inc. case already was notable in that United States District Court Judge Samuel Conti, in March 2008, had previously ruled  that allegations of a potentially increased risk of future identity theft were sufficient to make out a viable negligence claim under California law. At that time, Judge Conti denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and held that the plaintiff had alleged an injury in fact, even though he noted that it was unclear what damages the plaintiff would be able to recover even if the plaintiff were to prevail on the merits. Compared to the many cases holding to the contrary, the Ruiz case was generally viewed as an outlier, as one of the few rulings to have held that an allegation of the mere increased risk of identity theft was sufficient to defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

But just this month, Judge Conti granted summary judgment to the defendants on this same issue. In doing so, the court held that an increased risk of identity theft did not constitute “the level of appreciable harm necessary to assert a negligence claim under California law.” The court expressly rejected parallels to medical monitoring claims in the toxic tort context, and expressly noted similar cases from other jurisdictions – namely Louisiana, Ohio, and Minnesota – none of which were referenced in the court’s 2008 opinion denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The decision appears to reflect a reconsideration of sorts by the court – the evidence obtained during depositions seemed to be no different from what the plaintiff alleged in his Complaint, so if those allegations were adequate to defeat a motion to dismiss, testimony to the same effect should have also been adequate to defeat summary judgment. This is merely our own speculation, but it could be that the court became aware, over the course of the past year, of the growing and substantial body of case law which has been rejecting these types of speculative claims.
 

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The current economic climate has had many consequences, including an apparent increase in economic crimes such as credit card fraud. In recent months, numerous credit card scams involving restaurant chains have been reported. For example, the Washington Examiner reported on March 29 that wait staff at several high-end restaurants in Washington, DC, including M&S Grill, 701 Restaurant, Clyde’s of Gallery Place and Bowie’s Carrabba’s Italian Restaurant, stole credit card numbers from customers and ran up a $750,000 tab at various luxury retail stores. In addition, the article references a similar scam recently uncovered in New Orleans, in which a waitress at Bubba Gump Seafood Company used a skimming device to capture customers’ credit card information. “Skimming” devices, which can easily be purchased over the Internet, are small enough for wait staff to carry in their pockets or aprons, and within a second can capture the electronic information stored in a credit card’s magnetic strip.

While such scams obviously cost consumers, merchants are also victims due to loss of consumer trust, the time and expense of cooperating with authorities and, if applicable, notifying potentially affected customers, and potential lawsuits under negligence and/or negligent hiring theories. Although merchants can never be completely assured that rogue employees will not engage in theft, they should consider the following steps to mitigate their risk:

(1) Handle credit cards in view of the customer. If the customer never loses sight of the credit card, theft is more difficult if not impossible. Retailers, restaurants and other businesses may wish to consider switching to portable credit card processing devices that allow customers to pay at the table.

(2) Carefully screen job applicants. Simple background checks can identify applicants with prior criminal histories.

(3) Educate and monitor employees. Ensure that employees are aware of the risks and consequences of credit card fraud (e.g., mere possession of a skimming device is a felony in many states), and adopt policies for employees handling customer credit cards. Monitor employees and encourage them to report any suspicious activity on behalf of their coworkers.

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In order to avoid the substantial risks of class action litigation, many financial service providers – both traditional and non traditional – require that customer agreements contain an arbitration clause and a waiver of the customer’s right to bring a class action. However, recent court decisions and pending legislation suggest that certain types of these arbitration clauses may no longer be viable.

The overwhelming body of case law upholds the enforceability of such arbitration and class waiver provisions. See Adler v. Dell, Inc., No. 08-CV-13170, 2008 WL 5351042 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 18, 2008) (enforcing consumer arbitration provision with class waiver); Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., LLC, 400 F.3d 868 (11th Cir. 2005) (class waiver in borrowers’ payday loan agreements did not render arbitration agreements unconscionable or unenforceable); and Snowden v. CheckPoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631 (4th Cir. 2002) (rejecting argument that arbitration agreement was unenforceable as unconscionable due to class waiver).

However, recently some courts have taken issue with these provisions and deemed them unconscionable. A recent example of such a case is Homa v. American Express Co., No. 06-02985, 2009 WL 440912 (3rd Cir. Feb. 24, 2009).

In Homa, plaintiff brought a putative class action suit against American Express and its Centurion unit, alleging that they misrepresented the actual terms of the Blue Cash card rewards program and that defendants failed to award him the promised amount of cash back in violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act. However, the credit card member agreement that accompanied the Blue Cash card contained an arbitration and class waiver provision. Further, the agreement contained a choice-of-law provision indicating that any disputes arising out of the agreement would be governed by Utah law. Defendants argued that the plaintiff should be required to arbitrate his claims on an individual basis, because Utah law expressly allows arbitration and class waiver provisions in consumer credit agreements. On the other hand, the plaintiff argued that New Jersey law applied, because, as the application of Utah law would violate New Jersey’s public policy against certain class-arbitration waivers, New Jersey choice-of-law principles dictated that the agreement’s choice of Utah law was invalid. The district court sided with the defendants and dismissed plaintiff’s complaint.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision. In the opinion, the Third Circuit held that that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, did not preclude the district court from applying New Jersey unconscionability principles to void the arbitration and class waiver clause, and therefore, plaintiff was entitled to pursue a class action against defendants in federal court in New Jersey. In so doing, the Court relied on the holding in a New Jersey state court decision styled Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Delaware, 912 A.2d 88 (N.J. 2006), that “‘[t]he public interest at stake in . . . consumers[’] [ability to effectively] pursue their statutory rights under [New Jersey’s] consumer protection laws’ constituted the ‘most important’ reason for holding a similar class-arbitration waiver unconscionable.” Further, the Third Circuit held that this interest “overrides” a defendant’s right to seek enforcement of a class-arbitration waiver in an agreement, particularly where the claims at issue are of such a low value as effectively to preclude relief if pursued individually. The case is now back in the district court.

Furthermore, this issue may be resolved by pending federal legislation that seeks to ban certain types of arbitration provisions. The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 would ban provisions requiring arbitration of (1) an employment, consumer, or franchise dispute, or (2) a dispute arising under any statute intended to protect civil rights. See H.R. 1020   The bill, which was referred to the House Judiciary Committtee on Feb. 12, 2009, currently has 43 co-sponsors, including that Committee Chairman Conyers (D-MI). A recent Legal Times report noted the plaintiffs bar's efforts to push the arbitration legislation on Capitol Hill. If enacted, the Act could start a wave of litigation in the consumer financial services sector.

The bottom line is that businesses should re-examine their customer agreement’s arbitration and class waiver provisions, paying particular attention to any choice of law provisions, and monitor these legal developments on a state-by-state basis. Homa tells us that the same arbitration and class waiver provision, while being upheld in one state, could be rejected in another.

Stay tuned for future posts analyzing cases decided in the wake of Homa and reporting on further developments with the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009.
 

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The Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) eliminated longstanding barriers to removal of cases from state to federal court. To remove a class action under CAFA, it is no longer necessary for all plaintiffs and defendants to be completely diverse; now, only one class member and one defendant must be citizens of different states. Certain exceptions, however, including the local controversy exception, limit this broad access to federal court and provide a means for parties to keep certain actions in state court. The local controversy exception provides that federal court must decline jurisdiction where “significant” relief is sought from at least one defendant in the case whose conduct forms a “significant basis” for the claims asserted by the putative class. The Third Circuit, in Kaufman v. Allstate New Jersey Insurance Co., 561 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2009), recently became the first Court of Appeals to hold that CAFA does not require every class member to assert a claim against that local defendant for the action to remain in state court.

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